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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
Amici, scholars of constitutional law, 
citizenship, and of the jurisprudence of the federal 
courts, believe that their expertise would be of use to 
this Court in considering the scope and proper 
exercise of the federal courts’ remedial authority in 
cases challenging the constitutionality of gender 
disparities in citizenship statutes.  
A complete list of the Amici joining in this brief 
is provided in an Appendix at the back of this brief.  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Three well-established principles outline the 
proper approach for a federal court to follow when 
faced with a statute that violates equal protection.  
First, and centrally, the victim of the wrong is to be 
placed, to the maximum extent possible, in the 
position he or she would have occupied but for the 
wrong.  Second, out of respect for legislative decisions 
and separation of powers, courts remedying 
unconstitutional disparities in a statute should alter 
the statute as little as possible.  Third, this Court’s 
jurisprudence typically aims to eliminate 
unconstitutional disparities in the provision of a 
statutory benefit by extending and applying the 
specified benefit to the disfavored class rather than 
by withdrawing it from the favored class. 
                                                 
1 Counsel of record for all parties have consented in writing 
to the filing of this brief.  
No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in 
part, and no person or entity other than amicus curiae or their 
counsel made a monetary contribution to the preparation or 





Here, the Second Circuit properly applied this 
Court’s conventional practices when finding a 
constitutional violation.  The fundamental remedial 
goal of restoring Respondent to his rightful position 
can only be achieved in this case through extension, 
not nullification: citizenship cannot be withdrawn 
from those who have already become citizens 
pursuant to § 1409(c), even though they are—but for 
the sex of their American-citizen parent—identically 
situated to Respondent.  Moreover, even prospective 
nullification of § 1409(c) would frustrate Congress’s 
clear intention to confer citizenship on the children 
covered by it.  Thus, what the Second Circuit did here 
was to follow established precedent when faced with 
an unconstitutional aspect of a statute by replacing a 
gender-specific term with its gender-neutral 
equivalent. 
The finding that Respondent is entitled to 
citizenship under § 1409(c)—once the 
unconstitutional gender disparity is removed from 
the statute—is well within the authority of the courts.  
Respondent’s claim is that, but for an 
unconstitutional gender classification, he satisfies the 
statutory criteria for citizenship.  It is the 
responsibility of the federal courts to adjudicate such 
claims, and—if a statute is found unconstitutional—
to determine how the statute can be applied in the 
way most consistent with the congressional 
enactment.  Indeed, statutory grants of citizenship—
and citizenship more generally—are of special 
concern to this Court, which has repeatedly 
recognized the citizenship of individuals upon the 





Thus, this Court ought not depart from its ordinary 
practice of remedying unconstitutional provisions 
while leaving statutes intact. 
The central issue of gender-based classifications in 
this case has been before this Court previously, and  
six Justices have recognized that if § 1409(c) is found 
unconstitutional, there is no constitutional obstacle 
to the type of relief sought in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT, RESPECTFUL OF THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS, ORDINARILY 
REMEDIES STATUTORY VIOLATIONS OF 
EQUAL PROTECTION BY KEEPING 
INTACT AS MUCH OF THE 
CONGRESSIONAL ENACTMENT AS 
POSSIBLE. 
A holding that a statute violates equal protection 
raises the question of how federal courts should 
remedy the constitutional defect while hewing as 
closely as possible to the congressional scheme.  That 
question is not a novel one.  Rather, three well-
established principles outline the proper approach.  
First, the most fundamental principle of remedies is 
that the victim of a legal wrong is to be placed, as 
near as may be, in the position he or she would have 
occupied but for the wrong.  Second, out of respect for 
legislative decisions and separation of powers, this 
Court strives to implement the provisions of statutes 
to the maximum extent consistent with remedying 
the unconstitutional disparity.  Third, ordinarily, 
unconstitutional disparities in the provision of a 





benefit to the disfavored class rather than by 
withdrawing it from the favored class. 
The Second Circuit’s remedial approach—
“[c]onforming the immigration laws Congress enacted 
with the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection,” 
Pet. App. 41a—adheres to these longstanding 
principles.  The Government’s proposed remedy—
which would deny citizenship to many on whom 
Congress expressly conferred it, while at the same 
time leaving the Equal Protection violation largely 
unremedied—does not.  
A. Equal Protection Violations Are 
Remedied By Placing Victims of 
Discrimination in the Position They 
Would Have Occupied But For the 
Violation. 
The core principle of the law of remedies—and the 
ordinary remedy for constitutional violations—is that 
the victim of a legal wrong is to be restored, to the 
maximum extent feasible, to the position he or she 
would have occupied in the absence of the wrong.  
“With respect to both compensatory and preventive 
remedies, the goal is to restore or maintain plaintiff’s 
rightful position.”  Douglas Laycock, Modern 
American Remedies 265 (4th ed. 2010); see also id. at 
14–15 (defining the rightful position as the “position 
plaintiff would have been in but for the wrong”); 1 
Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 2.4(7) at 118 (2d ed. 
1993) (equitable remedy should “restore the plaintiff 
to her entitlement, no more, no less”). 
This principle is particularly clear in equal 





States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), “[a] remedial 
decree . . . must closely fit the constitutional violation; 
it must be shaped to place persons unconstitutionally 
denied an opportunity or advantage in ‘the position 
they would have occupied in the absence of 
[discrimination].’”  Id. at 547 (third alteration in 
original) (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 
280 (1977)); see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 
89 (1995) (goal is “restoring the victims of 
discriminatory conduct to the position they would 
have occupied in the absence of that conduct”); Estes 
v. Metro. Branches of Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437, 
447 (1980) (same).  As this Court has interpreted the 
principle, it means not only that ongoing 
unconstitutional discrimination must be eliminated, 
but that the remedy must “‘eliminate [so far as 
possible] the discriminatory effects of the past.’”  
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 547 (alteration in original) 
(quoting  Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 
154 (1965)).  
B. The Court Should Invalidate As Little Of 
a Statute As Necessary to Correct the 
Constitutional Infirmity.  
When one aspect of an otherwise valid statute is 
unconstitutional, this Court has long applied a 
“presumption of separability.”  Henry Paul 
Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 6; see 
also, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and 
Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1333 (2000).  This principle that 
the unconstitutional portion of a statute ordinarily 
may be excised, leaving the rest of the statute 





Cranch) 137 (1803), which invalidated only a single 
provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 while leaving 
the rest of the statute standing.  See Michael C. Dorf, 
Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 
STAN. L. REV. 235, 250 (1994).  
The principle reflects both the practice of this 
Court and the severance clauses frequently provided 
in statutes.  Indeed, the principle was expressly 
incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1952 (Pub. L. No. 82–414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)) 
(“1952 Act”), which contains a severance clause that 
provides: “If any particular provision of this Act, or 
the application thereof to any person or circumstance, 
is held invalid, the remainder of the Act . . . shall not 
be affected thereby.”  1952 Act § 406. 
In severing the unconstitutional portion of a 
statute, this Court is careful to avoid “nullify[ing] 
more of a legislature’s work than is necessary.”  
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 
546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006).  Indeed, because “[a] ruling 
of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the 
elected representatives of the people,” Regan v. Time, 
Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984) (plurality op.), this 
Court is guided by congressional intent and seeks the 
narrowest invalidation possible, “enjoin[ing] only the 
unconstitutional applications of a statute while 
leaving other applications in force, or . . .sever[ing] its 
problematic portions while leaving the remainder 
intact.”  Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 328–29 (internal citation 
omitted) (citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 
20-22 (1960) and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 





Although the cases frequently speak of “severing” 
the unconstitutional portion of a statute, the remedy 
for an unconstitutional statute may, as applied in 
particular situations, stop the unconstitutional 
application of a provision while applying the rest of 
the statute with minor alterations that are necessary 
to eliminate constitutional deficiencies.  For example, 
in Califano v. Westcott, the Court endorsed the 
district court’s decision to replace the statutory word 
“father” with its “gender-neutral equivalent.”  443 
U.S. 76, 92 (1979).  Similarly, in  Brockett v. Spokane 
Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985), after finding that 
a prohibition on material that “incites . . . lust” 
violated the First Amendment, the Court did not 
excise the word “lust” but instead effectively qualified 
it by holding that the statute would be “invalidated 
only insofar as the word ‘lust’ is to be understood as 
reaching protected materials.”  Id. at 504.   
At the same time, respect for legislative 
prerogatives  has also led this Court to minimize any 
alteration of statutes; when there are several ways in 
which a statute’s constitutional defect might be 
remedied, this Court has disapproved options that 
require “more extensive” rewriting of a statute in 
favor of those that minimize any such rewriting.  Free 
Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 
561 U.S. 477, 509–10 (2010) (declining to “blue pencil” 
multiple provisions of statute); see Tobias A. Dorsey, 
Sense and Severability, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 877, 894 
(2012) (“When there is more than one way to [render 
the statute constitutional], the Court should choose 
the approach that does the least damage to the 





 In short, “when confronting a constitutional flaw 
in a statute, [the Court] tr[ies] to limit the solution to 
the problem,” id. at 904, by fashioning a remedy 
consistent with what “‘Congress would have intended’ 
in light of the Court’s constitutional holding,” Booker, 
543 U.S. at 246 (quoting Denver Area Ed. Telecomm. 
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 767 (1996) 
(plurality op.)).   
C. This Court Ordinarily Remedies 
Unconstitutional Discrimination In the 
Provision of A Statutory Benefit by 
Extending the Benefit to the Disfavored 
Class, Not by Withdrawing It From the 
Class Congress Intended to Benefit. 
When this Court finds that a disparity in 
conferring statutory benefits violates the Equal 
Protection Clause, it must then decide how it will 
eliminate the unconstitutional disparity.  Such a 
disparity can be eliminated by either “withdrawal of 
benefits from the favored class [or] by extension of 
benefits to the excluded class.”  Heckler v. Mathews, 
465 U.S. 728, 740 (1984); see also Welsh v. United 
States, 398 U.S. 333, 364 (1970) (Harlan, J., 
concurring).   
Thus, the Court must decide whether to “level up” 
or “level down” the statute such that the 
unconstitutional classification is removed, and it 
makes this decision by looking to congressional intent.  
See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 365 (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(“In exercising the broad discretion conferred by a 
severability clause it is, of course, necessary to 
measure the intensity of commitment to the residual 





the statutory scheme that would occur by extension 
as opposed to abrogation.”); see also Deborah Beers, 
Extension Versus Invalidation of Underinclusive 
Statutes: A Remedial Alternative, 12 COLUM. J.L. & 
SOC. PROBS. 115 (1975) (the Court focuses primarily 
on legislative intent when determining whether to 
extend or invalidate a constitutionally defective 
statute). 
In addressing this question of how to cure an 
unconstitutional disparity in conferring benefits, this 
Court has consistently “suggested that extension, 
rather than nullification, is the proper course.”  
Califano, 443 U.S. at 89.  As then-Professor Ginsburg 
wrote in 1979, by extending under-inclusive statutes 
when they fail to comport with the Equal Protection 
Clause, “[t]he courts act legitimately . . . to preserve a 
law by moderate extension where tearing it down 
would be far more destructive of the legislature’s will.”  
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Judicial 
Authority to Repair Unconstitutional Legislation, 28 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 301, 324 (1979). 
Califano v. Westcott is instructive.  There, the 
Court addressed an unconstitutional classification in 
the Social Security Act that granted benefits to 
families with dependent children only if the father, 
not the mother, became unemployed.  443 U.S. at 78.  
After first concluding that its prior decisions 
“suggest[ed] strongly” that the Court possessed the 
remedial capacity “to order extension” of benefits 
under a statute, the Court held that the statute’s 
constitutional defect was properly remedied “by 
ordering that ‘father’ be replaced by its gender-





modification, “benefits simply will be paid to families 
with an unemployed parent on the same terms that 
benefits have long been paid to families with an 
unemployed father.”  Id at 92.   
The Court emphasized that it reached this 
conclusion because extension of benefits was in line 
with congressional intent, noting that the withdrawal 
of benefits from “[a]pproximately 300,000 needy 
children . . . would impose hardship on beneficiaries 
whom Congress plainly meant to protect.”  Id. at 90.  
Moreover, the Court explained that “[t]he presence in 
the Social Security Act of a strong severability clause 
likewise counsels against nullification, for it 
evidences a congressional intent to minimize the 
burdens imposed by a declaration of 
unconstitutionality upon innocent recipients of 
government largesse.”  Id. (internal citation omitted); 
see also Welsh, 398 U.S. at 363–64 (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (noting that a “broad severability clause” 
is “[i]ndicative of the breadth of the judicial mandate” 
to “extend[] the statute”).  Thus, the Court “adopted 
the simplest and most equitable extension possible” 
to ensure that the “beneficiaries whom Congress 
plainly meant to protect” remained covered by the 
statute.  Califano, 443 U.S. at 90, 92–93. 
Many other cases are to the same effect.  See, e.g., 
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) 
(extending Social Security benefits to men and 
women on equal terms to remedy Equal Protection 
violation); Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 637-
38 (1974) (same); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 
677, 691 n.25 (1973) (plurality op.) (same, and noting 





statutory schemes except insofar as they require a 
female member to prove the dependency of her 
spouse”); see also  Candace S. Kovacic, Remedying 
Underinclusive Statutes, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 39, 49-50 
nn.66-72 (1986) (collecting cases). 
Thus, as the Second Circuit noted in this case, this 
Court has consistently remedied Equal Protection 
violations by extending, rather than contracting, the 
statutory benefit.  Pet. App. 38a–39a.  Indeed, the 
only case in which the Court took a contrary view is 
the exception that proves the rule, as it turned on the 
existence of clear congressional intent not to extend 
the statutory benefits.  In Heckler v. Mathews, 465 
U.S. 728 (1984), the statute’s severability clause and 
the legislative history behind it made clear that if the 
statutory provision was “found invalid . . . the 
application of the exception clause would not be 
broadened to include persons or circumstances that 
are not included within it.”  Id. at 733-34.  Consistent 
with that specific congressional directive, the Court 
in Mathews recognized that “the severability clause 
would prevent a court from redressing [any] 
inequality by increasing the benefits payable to 
appellee.”  Id. at 738.  At the same time, the Court 
recognized that, absent such clear congressional 
intent, “ordinarily ‘extension, rather than 
nullification, is the proper course.’”  Id. at 739 n.5 





II. THE SECOND CIRCUIT PROPERLY 
REMEDIED THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEFECT HERE BY APPLYING THE 
BENEFITS OF SECTION 1409(C) TO BOTH 
MOTHERS AND FATHERS.  
In this case, the Court is faced with a choice 
between remedying the constitutional defect in 
§ 1409 by (1) nullifying § 1409(c) altogether, thereby 
withdrawing the benefit of citizenship from children 
of unwed citizen mothers who cannot otherwise meet 
the longer presence requirements of § 1409(a), or (2) 
expanding § 1409(c) to apply to both men and women, 
thereby providing the congressional benefit of 
citizenship to children born abroad to unwed citizen 
fathers on the same terms as this benefit is granted 
to children of unwed citizen mothers.  Amici submit 
that under the well-established principles described 
above, the Second Circuit’s decision to remedy the 
constitutional defect by application of the provisions 
of § 1409(c) to Respondent and others in his position 
was correct. 
First, the fundamental remedial goal of restoring 
Mr. Morales-Santana to his rightful position can only 
be achieved through extension, not nullification.  As 
the Government concedes, nullification can create 
only prospective equality, making citizenship under 
§ 1409(c) unavailable in the future both to children 
born to unwed male citizens and those born to unwed 
female citizens.  It cannot produce equality as to 
those, like Respondent, who have already been born, 
because the Constitution does not permit the 
withdrawal of citizenship from those who are already 





253 (1967).  Respondent will be denied citizenship, 
while otherwise identically situated children of 
unwed female citizens will continue to be citizens. 
A remedy that leaves such an ongoing disparity 
falls short of what this Court has traditionally 
considered necessary to remedy an Equal Protection 
violation.  As the Court stated in United States v. 
Virginia, “[a] proper remedy for an unconstitutional 
exclusion . . . aims to ‘eliminate [so far as possible] the 
discriminatory effects of the past’ and to ‘bar like 
discrimination in the future.’”  518 U.S. at 547 
(second alteration in original) (quoting Louisiana v. 
United States, 380 U.S. at 154).   
In that respect, this case resembles Iowa-Des 
Moines National Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931), 
in which a taxpayer subjected to discriminatory 
taxation was held to be entitled to a refund, where 
the “nullification” remedy—“an increase of the taxes 
which the [favored taxpayers] should have paid,” id. 
at 247—was likely impossible.  As Professor 
Ginsburg noted, “due process . . . would impede state 
officials from reaching back to impose and collect 
additional taxes from the favored competitors.”  28 
CLEVE. ST. L. REV. at 307; see also McKesson Corp. v. 
Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 
34–35 (1990) (describing an earlier case, Montana 
National Bank, as finding prospective-only relief 
inadequate to remedy a discriminatory tax because 
that would “not cure the mischief which had been 
done under the earlier construction” (quoting 
Montana National Bank v. Yellowstone County, 276 
U.S. 499, 504 (1928)).  As in these cases, the inability 





unconstitutional discrimination should weigh heavily 
against its adoption. 
Second, in the absence of a “clearly expressed [] 
preference for nullification, rather than extension” 
from Congress, as there was in Heckler v. Mathews, 
465 U.S. at 739 n.5, this Court should follow its 
ordinary practice, described above, of remedying 
Equal Protection violations by applying the benefits 
of § 1409(c) on a nondiscriminatory basis, rather than 
nullifying them.  We are aware of no evidence that 
Congress would have preferred nullifying § 1409(c) 
altogether, let alone the sort of clear expression 
necessary to justify a departure from this Court’s 
ordinary preference for extension over nullification. 
Third, although Amici do not purport to have 
special expertise concerning the intentions of the 
Congress that enacted § 1409(c), it appears that 
nullification of § 1409(c) would do far more to alter 
and frustrate the legislative scheme than would its 
extension to Respondent and those similarly situated.  
At a minimum, nullification would frustrate 
Congress’s clear intention to grant derivative 
citizenship to children of unwed citizen mothers who 
had been present in the United States for at least one 
continuous year before giving birth.  Further, one of 
the motivations behind the Act, was the “policy of 
preserving the unity of the family.”  S. Rep. No. 81-
1515 at 433–34 (Apr. 20, 1950).  And the increased 
difficulty of children obtaining the same citizenship 
as their American parent only heightens the 
possibility that family members will be separated 
from one another, contrary to Congress’ intention, 





this reason, too, extension, rather than nullification, 
of the conferred benefit here appears more consistent 
with Congress’s intent. 
Moreover, the INA, like the statute at issue in 
Califano, contains a strong severability clause.  
Although this clause alone does not fully address the 
question of congressional intent here, see Welsh, 398 
U.S. at 365 (Harlan, J., concurring), its presence 
“evidences a congressional intent to minimize the 
burdens imposed by a declaration of 
unconstitutionality upon innocent recipients of 
government largesse,” Califano, 443 U.S. at 90.    
Perhaps more significantly, the “burdens” that 
would result from nullification of the benefit 
conferred by Congress here are particularly heavy 
because of the importance of the benefit at issue: 
citizenship.  “Citizenship is a most precious right,” 
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159 
(1963), particularly in the United States.  See, e.g., 
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 122 
(1943) (“[I]t is safe to assert that nowhere in the 
world today is the right of citizenship of greater 
worth to an individual than it is in this country.  It 
would be difficult to exaggerate its value and 
importance.  By many it is regarded as the highest 
hope of civilized men.”).  Just as the nullification of a 
benefits program that impacted “300,000 needy 
children . . . would impose hardship on beneficiaries 
whom Congress plainly meant to protect,” the 
elimination of derivative citizenship for the class 
covered by § 1409(c) would exclude from the national 
community a group that Congress expressly deemed 





In addition, by the Government’s account, in the 
absence of § 1409(c), there was a “substantial risk 
that a child born out of wedlock to a U.S.-citizen 
mother in a country employing jus sanguinis rules of 
citizenship would be stateless at birth unless the 
child could obtain the citizenship of his mother.”  Pet. 
Br. at 34.2  Whatever the congressional motivation 
related to statelessness when the statute was enacted, 
the possibility that nullification of § 1409(c) would 
not only have deprived its beneficiaries of U.S. 
citizenship, but by the Government’s account might 
have rendered many of them stateless, makes it even 
less likely that Congress, faced with the choice, would 
have elected to eliminate § 1409(c). 
The Government warns that extension of § 1409(c) 
to Respondent and others like him would open the 
floodgates to “untold numbers” of foreigners.  Pet. Br. 
51.  But the Government provides no basis to believe 
that the “untold” number of individuals who (1) 
desire to claim U.S. citizenship, (2) were born out of 
wedlock to a U.S. citizen father, and (3) met the other 
applicable requirements of § 1409(c), including those 
relating to legitimation and/or parental responsibility, 
                                                 
2 As the Statelessness Scholars demonstrate, when enacted 
any risk of statelessness was not specific to children of 
American mothers; the ten-year residence requirement also put 
the foreign-born nonmarital children of American fathers at risk 
of statelessness.  Resp. Br. 37–38.  Hence, a remedy that “levels 
down” would arguably increase statelessness among foreign-
born nonmarital children of American mothers and fathers, and 
would thus run contrary to the Congress’s purported purpose in 





is extraordinarily large.3  Nor does the Government 
explain why a Congress that chose to confer 
citizenship on an equally “untold” number of children 
of unwed U.S. citizen mothers would have been so 
deterred by this prospect that it would have preferred 
to eliminate § 1409(c) entirely.   
Further, surely one could have characterized the 
impact of Weinberger v. Weisenfeld as involving 
“untold numbers” of widowers, but whatever the 
numbers, the lessons of this Court’s law is clear.  
Equal Protection remedies should respect the 
congressional scheme and implement as much as can 
be implemented while adjusting the statute to 
eliminate its unconstitutional facets.  
In sum, Amici are aware of no persuasive reason to 
depart from the usual practice of remedying an Equal 
Protection violation by extending the statutory 
benefit to the disfavored class. 
III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S 
DETERMINATION REFLECTS A 
CONVENTIONAL APPLICATION OF 
ESTABLISHED EQUAL PROTECTION 
PRINCIPLES, AND IS WELL WITHIN THE 
AUTHORITY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS. 
The Second Circuit’s determination that, 
“[c]onforming the immigration laws Congress enacted 
with the Constitution’s guarantee of equal 
protection . . . Morales-Santana is a citizen as of his 
birth,” Pet. App. 41a, was a faithful and conventional 
                                                 
3 Those requirements have varied in different versions of 





application of this Court’s guidance for remedying 
Equal Protection violations.  Contrary to the 
Government’s assertion that this holding “exceeds 
the court’s authority with respect to naturalization,” 
Pet. Br. 49, in violation of INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 
875 (1988), the Second Circuit applied the provisions 
of § 1409(c), save for its unconstitutional distinction 
between fathers and mothers.  
A. The Second Circuit’s Finding That 
Respondent Is a Citizen Under the 
Statute, Once Rendered Constitutional, Is 
Squarely Within the Judicial Power. 
The Government’s contention that the Second 
Circuit’s decision was beyond judicial authority, 
because the courts lack “the power to make someone 
a citizen of the United States,” Pet. Br. 50 (quoting 
Pangilinan, 486 U.S. at 883-84), misconstrues 
Pangilinan and mistakenly conflates naturalization 
with at-birth citizenship. 
Although the federal courts have traditionally 
shown significant deference to the political branches 
with respect to immigration and naturalization, they 
have properly distinguished between claims of 
citizenship and claims seeking naturalization, and 
have recognized the special status of citizenship.  
This Court made clear nearly a century ago, in Ng 
Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922), that 
individuals claiming citizenship are in a 
fundamentally different category from foreign 
nationals, and unlike such foreign nationals—who 
were subject to exclusively executive deportation 
proceedings—are entitled to judicial review of their 





deportation exists only if the person arrested is an 
alien.  The claim of citizenship is thus a denial of an 
essential jurisdictional fact.”  Id. at 284; see also 
Agosto v. INS, 436 U.S. 748, 753 (1978) (“[T]he 
Constitution requires that there be some provision 
for de novo judicial determination of claims to 
American citizenship in deportation proceedings.”)  
Moreover, the authority of the political branches 
over immigration and naturalization exists only 
within the bounds set by the Constitution.  When 
“what is challenged . . . is whether Congress has 
chosen a constitutionally permissible means of 
implementing that power,” this Court has recognized 
its “duty . . . of which it may not shrink, to give full 
effect to the provisions of the Constitution.”  INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940–41, 943 (1983).  Indeed, 
the Court has never hesitated to exercise its judicial 
review responsibilities when, as here, an individual 
claims that statutory provisions that would deny him 
or her citizenship are unconstitutional.  See, e.g., 
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 432 (1998) (plurality 
op.); Afroyim, 387 U.S. 253 (termination of 
citizenship unconstitutional); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 
U.S. 163, 166 (1964) (unconstitutional to discriminate 
between native-born and derivative citizens); Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (expatriation provision 
unconstitutional).   
This Court’s assumption of its responsibility to 
recognize the citizenship of an individual upon the 
invalidation of a statute that denied him or her 
citizenship has deep roots.  In United States v. Wong 
Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 704 (1898), this Court 





Act, 22 Stat. 61—which, among other things, stated 
that no “court of the United States shall admit 
Chinese to citizenship.”  Finding that the Act ran 
afoul of the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court held that Wong Kim Ark was 
a citizen of the United States.  See id. at 704-05. 
In confirming the petitioner’s citizenship after it 
had invalidated the statute’s unconstitutional 
application, the Court emphasized that it was not 
granting citizenship in contravention of Congress’s 
plenary authority under Article I, Section 8, Clause 4.  
Rather, it was recognizing that the individual met 
the legal requirements for citizenship once the 
unconstitutional statutory provisions were removed, 
and that Congress’ plenary authority over 
naturalization did not prevent a court from so 
holding.  See id. at 704 (“The fact, therefore, that acts 
of congress or treaties have not permitted Chinese 
persons born out of this country to become citizens by 
naturalization, cannot exclude Chinese persons born 
in this country from the operation of the broad and 
clear words of the constitution . . . .).  Thus, the Court 
in Wong Kim Ark—as in later cases like Afroyim and 
Trop—saw its holding as a straightforward exercise 
of its traditional judicial responsibility to “say what 
the law is.”  See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178.  
This case is similar.  As in Wong Kim Ark, the 
Government denies that the Respondent is a citizen 
on the ground that he fails to satisfy an allegedly 
unconstitutional statutory requirement.  In 
addressing the constitutional claim, it is within the 
courts’ power both to determine whether the gender-





and—if it does—to determine whether it is more 
faithful to Congress’s intent to cure the violation by 
extending the benefits of § 1409(c) to fathers or by 
withdrawing them from mothers.  Choosing the 
former remedy does not amount to the creation of a 
judge-made right to citizenship; rather, it is an 
ordinary effort to effectuate congressional intent to 
the maximum extent possible.  
This case is therefore entirely different from 
Pangilinan, in which the lower court ordered that 
certain foreign nationals be naturalized as a judge-
made equitable remedy that was concededly contrary 
to congressional intent.  Critically, it was 
“incontestable (and uncontested) that respondents 
have no statutory right to citizenship,” 486 U.S. at 
882-83, and the plaintiffs asked the Court to order 
their naturalization by the “invocation of [its] 
equitable powers.”  Id. at 885.  The Court rejected 
this request, holding that it lacked independent 
power to confer citizenship upon non-citizens:  “the 
power to make someone a citizen of the United States 
has not been conferred upon the federal courts . . . as 
one of their generally applicable equitable powers.”  Id. 
at 883–84 (emphasis added).  However, while ruling 
out any independent judicial authority to confer 
citizenship, the Court left untouched the courts’ 
responsibility to adjudicate constitutional or 
statutory claims to citizenship. 
Indeed, in Pangilinan itself, after rejecting the 
respondents’ request for an exercise of the courts’ 
general equitable powers as beyond judicial authority, 
this Court went on to address on the merits—with no 





respondents’ constitutional claims seeking identical 
relief.  
Here, the Court is in no way being asked to 
exercise any purported independent judicial 
authority to confer citizenship.  Nor is it being asked 
to order the naturalization of any non-citizen.  
Respondent argues that under § 1409, as properly 
(and constitutionally) interpreted, he became a 
citizen at birth.  The Court is being asked to perform 
the core judicial function of remedying an Equal 
Protection violation—a task which includes 
determining how to eliminate the unconstitutional 
portion of the statute in the way most consistent with 
congressional intent.  This classic judicial function 
does not intrude on Congress’s authority over 
naturalization in any way, and implicates no 
constitutional concern.  This Court’s role in filling 
gaps and fashioning remedies for constitutional 
violations is a familiar one, and one that properly 
respects congressional authority.  See Daniel J. 
Meltzer, Harmless Error and Constitutional 
Remedies, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 26-27 (1994). 
For similar reasons, the Government’s reliance on 
8 U.S.C. § 1421(d), which specifies that “[a] person 
may only be naturalized as a citizen of the United 
States in the manner and under the conditions 
prescribed in [Title III of the INA] and not otherwise,” 
is misplaced.  Pet. Br. 51 n.11.  Here, what 
Respondent seeks is not naturalization—the subject 
of § 1421(d)—but rather a determination that by 
operation of law he is already a citizen.  As this Court 
established long ago in Ng Fung Ho, individuals 





category from non-citizens.  259 U.S. at 284–85.  
Congress, moreover, has incorporated that 
constitutional principle into the INA:  Determination 
of an individual’s claim of citizenship in a removal 
proceeding is not governed by § 1421(d), but by 
§ 1252(b)(5), which not only permits but requires the 
federal courts to decide such claims:  See id. 
(determination by court “[i]f the petitioner claims to 
be a national of the United States”); see also Agosto, 
436 U.S. at 753 (“In carving out this class of cases 
[for judicial review], Congress was aware of our past 
decisions holding that the Constitution requires that 
there be some provision for de novo judicial 
determination of claims to American citizenship in 
deportation proceedings.” (citing Ng Fung Ho, 259 
U.S. at 284)).  
Because Respondent claims citizenship by 
operation of law, and because he is not seeking an 
exercise of general equitable authority, Pangilinan 
has no application.  Rather, the courts are fully 
empowered to remedy the claimed Equal Protection 
violation in conformity with conventional principles.  
Whatever the breadth of the so-called “plenary 
powers” doctrine, it cannot be read to reach 
citizenship rights obtained through birth abroad, if 
the statutory criteria for such citizenship are met.  
B. Six Justices Have Indicated that an 
Extension of  § 1409(c) to Remedy a 
Constitutional Violation Is a Permissible 
Exercise of Judicial Authority. 
This issue has been before this Court before, and 
six Justices have, on prior occasions, determined that 





here.  In Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998), as in 
this case, the Court considered a Fifth Amendment 
Equal Protection “challenge to the distinction drawn 
by section § 309 of the [INA], as amended, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1409, between the child of an alien father and a 
citizen mother, on the one hand, and the child of an 
alien mother and a citizen father, on the other.”  Id. 
at 424 (plurality op.).  Although the Court splintered 
on the merits, five Justices expressly recognized that 
confirmation of the Petitioner’s citizenship following 
the severance of an unconstitutional provision would 
be an appropriate remedy and would not encroach 
upon Congress’s plenary authority over matters of 
naturalization. 
First, Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality and 
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, rejected the notion 
that the Petitioner lacked standing because, due to 
the gender-based classification in § 1409, she was not 
a citizen of the United States, and therefore had “no 
substantive rights cognizable under the Fifth 
Amendment.”  Id. at 433 n.10.  The plurality opinion 
noted that “[e]ven if th[is] is so, the question to be 
decided is whether petitioner is such an alien or 
whether, as she claims, she is a citizen.”  Id.  In the 
event that the Court concluded that the Petitioner 
was indeed a citizen, the plurality explained, that 
holding would not infringe Congress’s plenary 
authority under Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the 
Constitution because a “judgment in her favor would 
confirm her pre-existing citizenship rather than 






Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Souter and 
Ginsburg, echoed this principle in dissent.  Rejecting 
the claim that the Court was “powerless to find a 
remedy,” Justice Breyer noted that the “remedy is 
simply that of striking from the statute the two 
subsections that offend the Constitution’s equal 
protection requirement.”  Id. at 488 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting).  “With those [unconstitutional] 
subsections omitted,” the Petitioner would then meet 
all of the requirements of the statute.  Id.   As a 
result, unlike in Pangilinan, the Petitioner in Miller 
became a “citizen of the United States at birth” by 
virtue of the statue passed by Congress, once cured of 
its constitutional defect.  Id. at 488–89 (alteration 
omitted).  As Justice Breyer explained: “Whatever 
limitations there may be upon the Court’s power to 
grant citizenship, those limitations are not applicable 
here, for the Court need not grant citizenship.  The 
statute itself grants citizenship automatically, and ‘at 
birth.’  And this Court need only declare that that is 
so.”  Id. at 488.  
Three years later, in Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 
(2001), Justice O’Connor added her voice to this 
consensus. 4   Nguyen, like Miller and the present 
dispute, again involved a Fifth Amendment Equal 
Protection challenge to the “different requirements” 
imposed by 8 U.S.C. § 1409 “for the child’s acquisition 
of citizenship depending upon whether the citizen 
                                                 
4  While Justice O’Connor participated in Miller, she 
concurred in the judgment on standing grounds, and therefore 
had no occasion to address the remedial issue.  See Miller, 523 





parent is the mother or the father.”  533 U.S. at 56–
57.   Writing in dissent, and joined by Justices Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer, Justice O’Connor expressed 
her disagreement with the suggestion by the majority 
that “[t]here may well be ‘potential problems with 
fashioning a remedy’ were [the Court] to find the 
statute unconstitutional.”  Id. at 72 (quoting Miller, 
523 U.S., at 451 (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
judgment)).   
She offered three reasons for this conclusion.  First, 
severance of the unconstitutional portions of § 1409 
was possible, and therefore a remedy could be 
afforded to the Petitioner, because Congress included 
a “general severability clause” in the INA which “is 
unambiguous and gives rise to a presumption that 
Congress” intended for the “validity of the INA as a 
whole, or any part of the INA to depend on whether’ 
any one provision was unconstitutional.”  Id. at 94–
95 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (brackets omitted) 
(quoting Chahda, 462 U.S. at 932).   
Second, she argued, as Respondent does here, that 
nothing in Pangilinan precludes the confirmation of 
citizenship by this Court, because petitioners did not 
“seek the exercise of . . . equitable power[s],” but 
instead the “severance of the offending provisions so 
that the statute, free of its constitutional defect, can 
operate to determine whether citizenship was 
transmitted at birth.”  Id. at 95-96.   
Finally, Justice O’Connor noted that “this Court 
has often concluded that, in the absence of legislative 
direction not to sever the infirm provision, extension, 
rather than nullification, of a benefit is more faithful 





Justice O’Connor agreed with the plurality and 
dissenting opinions in Miller that a remedy 
recognizing the Petitioner’s citizenship would not 
intrude on Congress’s exclusive authority to regulate 
naturalization under the Constitution. 
In sum, six Justices, including five of the Justices 
in Miller, have recognized that no constitutional 
problem is raised by the requested remedy here.  
Amici’s point is not that this creates a binding 
precedent entitled to stare decisis.  Rather, it simply 
confirms the extent to which the Second Circuit’s 
ruling in this case—and the argument offered 
above—is deeply consistent with longstanding views 
on the authority of the federal courts to remedy equal 
protection violations, in the field of immigration law 
and otherwise.  In contrast, only two Justices have 
ever appeared to endorse the government’s argument 
here—that the requested remedy confers citizenship 
in violation of Congress’s plenary authority over 
immigration. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73, 74 
(2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (joined by Thomas, J.); 
Miller, 523 U.S. at 452–53 (Scalia, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (joined by Thomas, J.).  Indeed, as 
Justice Scalia himself acknowledged, a “majority of 
the Justices in Miller . . . concluded otherwise.”  
Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 73 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
       *                               *   * 
 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm 
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